Again, I don't think you understand my question. Of course we make money because the game isn't solved - hence people make "bad" decisions, but that practical argument doesn't answer my theoretical question. At least not in my understanding.
Ironically, I'm actually in the middle of the preparation for an exam in a game theory course I'm taking as a part of my bachelors degree in Economics and Management. I probably should have waited to participate in this discussion after I've covered the whole curriculum - or at least the part covering games covering poker. I will return when I've covered the DGII part, hoping we can discuss on a more equal level then.
Thank you for your answers, by the way.
May 24, 2014 | 1:32 a.m.
Let me give it a little more thought and I will think about a better formulation and come back.
May 23, 2014 | 11:23 p.m.
There's a reply button by the way. :)
May 23, 2014 | 10:59 p.m.
But if I'm losing money going all in with QQ-JJ, then I'm not really indifferent between calling and folding? You're probably referring to a pot where we're indifferent to calling/folding after a 3bet or 4bet, but then again we're probably not indifferent between our actions in the initial preflop node?
I know the example is very much restrictive. I made it up because of TheNumba1's statement about the equilibrium strategy winning the pot "invested so far". I couldn't really see how this would earn us money if we're truly playing an equilibrium strategy where we're making villain indifferent on every street. But as Joe Sham stated below, this would make us win the blinds.
May 23, 2014 | 10:55 p.m.
My next line of thought: The initial pot before our first raise must be the blinds. What if we assume a poker game without blinds and again truly make villain indifferent between calling or folding - where we again assume villain has no other options for the sake of an easier discussion - both preflop and on every street postflop. Then where's the profit of our equilibrium strategy even though villain doesn't play the same equilibrium strategy? How can he make mistakes if we're making him indifferent on all streets?
Like in Roshambo (rock, paper, scissors). If we play a NE-strategy - picking uniformly random between the three options - the game will automatically tie. Would this happen in poker to without rake? If in a HU match one player plays an equilibrium strategy, would this force the two players to break-even regardless of villains strategy?
May 23, 2014 | 10:41 p.m.
May 23, 2014 | 10:13 p.m.
BB: $106.36 (Hero)
UTG raises to $3, HJ folds, CO calls $3, BN calls $3, SB folds, Hero raises to $17, UTG calls $14, CO folds, BN folds
May 18, 2014 | 8:21 p.m.
I don't like your choice of hand for a c/r, as it makes you c/r with a seemingly high frequency. A better choice, i.e. Ah3h, also increases your equity when called, thus increasing your overall payoff of the c/r and consequently your winrate.
The problem with your idea of playing the trap-bluff-game is that the 5c on the turn decreases the combinations of value c/r's in your flop c/r-range, hence leaning your overall range more towards bluffs than value.
I agree with c/f flop btw.
May 14, 2014 | 2:34 p.m.
While it's highly entertaining with some 300/600 live action, I actually think this is one of your worst (less good!!) videos, as I think it's hard for us mortals to learn very much from a video like this, besides the CREV analysis-part. Too few hands I guess.
That being said, I do love your videos and your approach to the game. If you ever need an idea for a video, I would love seeing some videos from you with a more exploitive standpoint. You kind of have the perfect starting point to discuss how to exploit different inferior strategies found at the lower stakes, as you're probably one of the best players in terms of balance/theory/"GTO".
Keep up the good work.
May 11, 2014 | 10:26 p.m.
Have you read Jandas book?
May 11, 2014 | 12:40 a.m.
I'm not sure your question makes sense. If villain calls 30% of the time regardless of your sizing, the best sizing is obviously to shove with the nuts.
If you think he cares about your sizing, you want to bet 2,33 times pot (isolate x in 1-(x/(x+1))=0,3), as this implies you're bluffing with a frequency of 30% of the combinations in your value range, if you're using minimum defence frequencies as equilibriums.
May 8, 2014 | 10:32 p.m.
I think ATo works better in a 4bet range vs. the NL100 SB 3b ranges I play against, as I don't think they're 3betting as wide as their equity actually allows them to, nevertheless wide enough to be unbalanced in their call 4b/5b ranges.
It's probably a fold on the river as played. I think you're folding way too much if you fold turn, even though I often feel it's the best play $-wise, but I can't find enough potential bluffs from villain to justify a call on the river with AT, exploitive or not.
May 8, 2014 | 10:22 p.m.
May 8, 2014 | 10:14 p.m.
Hero folds, Hero folds, Hero folds, Hero folds, Hero raises to $2.50, Hero calls $2
May 8, 2014 | 9:47 p.m.
No offence, but any decent 3/6 player should know that a nice readable layout is a much better path towards any good pokerdiscussion. This is just confusing. Redo OP and I'm sure you'll get good answers.
May 8, 2014 | 7:58 p.m.
It can happen though, at least in the computable part of the theory we understand so far, that you're in a situation where you have to fold your entire range. I do however think that those situations will happen primarily as a result of an inferior composition of our range.
May 8, 2014 | 7:29 p.m.
Seems like a trivial call turn and call river, as it's impossible to balance a shoving range on the turn. If you fold here, you're folding everything except boats and quads. That would be pretty easy to exploit.
May 8, 2014 | 1:59 p.m.
I 3b pre.
I think river is a c/c, not a lead. His range contains a lot of bluffs on this runout. You want to keep these bluffs in his range. By leading you're only getting value from a very small part of his range, thus decreasing your EV.
As played, on the river, you can probably fold.
May 7, 2014 | 12:36 p.m.
May 7, 2014 | 12:24 p.m.
I just think it fits better in a pre flatting range in at spot like this, if it isn't a value squueze.
NFD or not I'd expect UTGs flat sqz-range to be kind of Ax-heavy, and thus my reversed implied odds statement. But again, I might be wrong.
May 7, 2014 | 12:17 p.m.
You're probably the best judge on whether or not you can make an exploitable fold, but I think it's a snapcall considering your range. You 3bet AA, JJ, probably TT and some KQ. Even if you don't 3bet some KQ hands, there's still only something like three combination of KQ in your river-range as played, not taking into account whether or not you check back some of those combinations on the turn. Consequently, 66 is the top of your range.