I have a syntax question for you. Lets say I want to include all double pairs that are single suited or double suited in a range of hands. Is it possible to write this syntax in a single line?
Now I am writing (RROO)$ss, (RROO),$ds in order to include both and it seems a bit stupid.
Oct. 21, 2016 | 6:24 a.m.
I was wondering how one should go about bluff-stacking turns in a multi-street game (by bluff-stacking I mean that you have a higher ratio of bluffs to value on the turn in a multi-street game than you would in a single-street game since some bluffs will convert into value on certain rivers and so on (M.O.P)).
Im finding it hard to know how much bluffs to stack in order to be well balanced. Are their any guideline ratios one should aim for on certain board structures, for instance, draw heavy two-tone, dry etc. Has anybody got any good experience in this field that they could share?
The questioning is probably quite abstract but Im sure some of you out there know what Im talking about.
April 14, 2016 | 7:54 p.m.
How would you play this spot?
Blinds: 800/400 with ante
Unknown Hijack opens 1600
I 3bet from CO to 4000 with AQo
He shoves I call.
Is this a standard get in vs unknown? or would you prefer a flat?
The BTN and Blinds are passive regs.
Nov. 30, 2015 | 10:15 a.m.
This is probably not in the right forum so feel free to move it, but I thought high stakes players would have more insight in this kind of theory oriented question.
Lets say we play a game where Hero always has either nuts/bluff on the river and Villain always have a bluff catcher.
What percentage of nut to bluff ratio must Hero have in order for Villain to be indifferent between calling/folding given different bet sizes? I can't seem to get the math to make sense.
Lets say Hero bet:
Lets say the pot is 100 and Hero bets 100 on the river (100% pot). According to my initial thought Hero must win the pot 50 % of the time in order for his bet size to break even, risk 100 to win 100. So given this I thought I would set Hero's range to include 50% nuts and 50% bluffs.
Lets say Villan is confused about what to do and just calls 100% of the time.
Heros payoff will be: 0.5* (100) + 0.5 * (-100) = 0
Villans payoff will be: 0.5 (-100) + 0.5*(200) = 50
This is not the result we want... Villan turns a profit employing this strategy.
Whats the formula for solving the correct nut to bluff ratio, making villain indifferent to calling/folding?
If Hero has 67% nuts 33% bluff and Villain still calls all the time:
Heros payoff will be: 0.67(100) + 0.33(-100) = 34
Villans payoff will be: 0.67(-100) + 0.33(200) = 0
This result looks better and Villain seems to be indifferent between calling/folding but I came up with these numbers just by trial and error.
Am I on the right track? and how do you employ minimum defense frequency into this?
With my above calculation Villain is calling 100%, that doesn't seem right either.
According to minimum defense frequency he should be calling 1- 100(/100+100) = 50%
I would appreciate if someone could clarify some calculations/concepts for me.