postwar18

It must take tremendous courage for unsympathetic dolts to mindlessly and hypocrtically lend their support to those reliant on their position, rather than their intellect or capacity for thoughtful repoonse, to persecute the defiant. Kudos to you if such ineloquent and unctious blather is all it takes to satisfy your pride and sense of solidarity.

29:07 table 1: I think that, in theory, you're supposed to call Tx rather than 3x vs this sizing, especially if you're correctly polarizing on the turn as IP. However, given the hand OOP showed up with, it seems OOP is likely seriously over-bluffing in this spot; at the very least, OOP should be limiting himself to his ss and cc trash if he's betting a size that reps a Q. It appears KT and AT are also value bets for this size, although I doubt OOP is going to as readily bet them for value as he is to pull bluffs from parts of his range that can't support it. Therefore, I like your call.

What a load of inarticulate nonsense. I am annoyed because I think you’re a petty reactionary less concerned with responding to the merits of the criticism than that it was made in the first place. Furthermore, simply claiming not to be involved in self-justification doesn’t make it so; it’s a vulgar form of sententious posturing.
In this case, you were value-betting—unsuccessfully. Show me some instances in which you save money by bluffing for the smaller size, rather than the larger, in the belief that opponent will over-fold his ‘air,’ and then you can talk: I’ve seen some of your other videos and I can’t recall you ever, in this line, successfully bluffing for the smaller size knowing that your opponent will over-fold a certain class of hands, regardless of the size of your bet; nor have you proved that IP might overbluff facing a small bet, quite the opposite, in fact. IP justified his decision according to his own misunderstanding of GTO; his fold goes no way towards validating your bet, especially since I’ve already said, but apparently must repeat, you had the nuts. If you’re so confident that IP will over fold his ‘air’ (the way you class hands that will fold to either small bet or large bet), maybe you should have checked, and tried to maximize your EV against overbluffs. As matters stand, you certainly didn’t maximize your EV in this hand.

6:55 table 3: I understand the principle of wanting to call with JJ that block the Qx suited. Interestingly, according to solver, apart from actually being inclined to bet this combo more than others on the flop, it also wants to jam turn, forcing a lot of flush draws with a lot of equity to fold. On the river, it prefers calling JsJc, more than any other JJ combo, facing jam, because IP is expected to give up with cc and ss bluffs and triple barrel with hh and dd combos. According to theory, then, you're more concerned about playing back against the manner in which a GTO opponent plays their flush draws and zero-equity triple barrels than you are about making call-downs according to the frequency with which they'll have Qx. In practice, I don't think there are many IP players who triple barrel JdTd or 9dTd in this spot, however; whether that means that they'll be overbluffing with missed ss and cc combos, I don't know: presumably not. Altogether, seems like a spot where you can overfold bluff-catchers on the river, particularly when you have more of them than might be expected, according to GTO.

Finding the bluffs in the block/pot/block line is a lot more difficult than finding the value bets, even if you know from whence they might be drawn, itself no easy task: the solver mixes a large variety of hands include pairs and high card hands that might also be used to bluff for the larger sizing: I seriously doubt most humans' abilities to execute a strategy at all closely aligned with theory. I understand that you're inordinately gifted; but even you, I'd presume, would have trouble, in practice, in mixing your overbet and block bluffs in a manner so as to best target those Qx or Kx hands for folds. I think anyone, knowing they were trying to target those hands, would be inclined to bluff larger more frequently than the strategy employed by the solver, trying to ensure a fold, rather than attempting, in an exceptionally complex and sophisticated manner, to push those hands towards indifference against multiple sizings. As for those A7-A9 hands, I don't see what that has to do with anything. It means you'll have less value, which, I'd assume, would mean you'd also be allowed fewer bluffs; that argues against carving out a smaller-sized bluffing range. Although I might be 'mental,' I wasn't arguing that IP wouldn't raise AJ against block-pot-block. Rather, I don't think he'd go all in with it, something you both acknowledged in the video. Perhaps, he might almost always call against the 3B shove, but that's hardly of any consequence. According to the sim you used, facing a GTO villain, you'd be getting stacks in by the river anyway.
Finally, as far as AJ goes, the same principle applies: villain won't have slow played enough of it, in practice, by the river. Even weaker players, in my experience, will understand implicitly how capped their ranges are by the river, and will refrain from making as many bluff raises as they'd be allowed were they playing a GTO strategy: blocking with the nuts is a strategy that suffers significantly when IP isn't bluff-raising as much as one, according to a GTO sim, would expect.

last hand: I think BVB OOP block, pot, block is a line wherein population lacks bluffs, especially on boards in which the nuts doesn't change.* The only circumstance in which this wouldn't be the case is a situation in which OOP expects too many bluff raises on the part of IP; in this hand, that hardly seems to apply, however. If anything, it's pretty unlikely IP slowplays as much KQ as is expected by the solver. Therefore, not considering raising the river, whether it be with this hand or some other Q blocker that in theory does more raising, seems fine. Conversely, blocking the river without a reasonable expectation of facing bluff raises, or for that matter large, thin value raises (e.g. AJ) seems bad. Furthermore, overbetting the river pushes Ax hands, which you unblock, towards indifference. Depending on the dynamic you've established with the IP player--for example, if you've previously challenged their lack of flop slowplays by bluffing large on turns and rivers aggressively --you might get them to overcall river with Ax facing overbet.

*The sorts of hands one uses as a bluff and the way one goes about mixing those hands is also excessively complex

28:00: I don't like double barrell turn sizing or combo. Your size does not target his Ax hands for turn folds, which I think is desirable. Moreover, the sizing puts you, IP, in some tought river spots on relative blanks, e.g. 2c, wherein you don't really know what to do with hands like AQ: they want value but they don't want to go all in (as opposed to overbetting AQ on turn and checking river, thereby making more money overall)*. Finally, QsJs is particularly bad in that unblocks all his Ax suited flop calls. Overall, this means you're not going to get nearly as many folds as you would like with this hand.

*This is particularly the case against OOP's apparent suboptimal strategy wherein he's failing to raise his sets on the flop or turn. This allows you to really punish his range with larger turn bets. Against them he's going to be calling an inrodinate amount of weaker Ax and not put you in a difficult spot by raising and playing for stacks.

27:18 I agree with the fold generally. I think you're also on to something regarding calling with the low kings. It seems, according to the preformed sim upon which you relied, that even given a strong GTO opponent, one calls more of the low kings than the higher ones, assuming IP is composing his turn bluffs mostly from the broadway, turned gutters, that he didn't bet on flop. The only reason OOP might still include mix some folds with the lower kings and mix some calls with the higher ones is that in addition to those sorts of turned broadway gutters, IP might turn some low pairs into overbet bluffs on the turn. I think in practice, this is never the case. Some strong players might overbet bluff low-pairs on the turn. Nonetheless, virtually no one seems to mix checks with their low pairs on the flop and then decide to use them as overbluffs on the turn.

26:00: OOP almost never bluffs SS or CC combos on the turn, therefore, if he is betting those hands he has an inordinate amout of value to bluff combos. Conversely, IP bluffs relatively more hh and dd hands hands, e.g. QdJd or QhJh. Therefore, with a range of indifferent Kx hands--not just KQ, but other suited Kx hands as well (the Kx folds facing overbet vary according to the parameters of the sim, but the principle doesn't)--one is generally more likely to call non DD combos facing overbets.

25:27 Table 1: not a big fan of flop Cbet. Seems like the sort of hand wherein you have just enough equity, between the wrap and the weak backdoor flush draw, that you'd rather realize it than bet-fold. I'd guess one would prefer hands with one diamond blocker, that has no equity but blocks raises and can potentially bluff diamond runouts, or hands with, for instance, a jack and a pair lower than 99 that blocks value, but doesn't stand to lose equity at all by folding much by folding. Another consideration would be what sort of hands you're looking to fold OOP off of by betting 1/2 pot. Presumably you're targeting some of his weakest gutshots without much going for them or his weakest Jx. It seems you could probably get those hands to fold anyway, on later streets, if none of your draws materialize and you're left with Q-high. The flip-side of that is that OOP might himself try to bluff some of the weak-gutshot type hands on later streets that would have simply folded to flop bets. However, it seems, assuming flush draw doesn't come in you can still continue against most turn bets against most turn cards with this hand, facing a bet; then, if OOP bets turn and checks river, you can bluff (assuming you continue to miss) knowing that OOP bet turn check river is usually a fairly weak, give-up range.

24:00: IP bets an absurd sizing (from a mathematical perspective) on the flop: as we see, it's almost never used according to GTO. The very little the solver does use this middling size seems consonant with the exact strength of particular middle-strength hands, namely KTo and QTo. Against these hands, on the river, your 1/4 block loses a tiny bit, but not much at all. Conversely, I think you have a lot to potentially gain by blocking against A8 type hands, which IP will have in his range much more frequently than the solver (relative to QTo and KTo). Assuming IP never turns hands like A8 into value raises, which is likely the case, your block is good.

30:00: I think the most important consideration, by far, in these spots wherein you''re considerating a semi-bluff jam, is how often OOP is bet-folding the hands that dominate yours; for instance, how frequently he's bet folding AK, AQ, KQ. At GTO frequencies, your hand is already a jam. Against opponents who are going to be betting an inordinate amount of AK, AQ, KQ, it becomes enormously profitable.

20:00 Good river check. It appears that, because IP value-jams Qx when checked to, by putting AA in the x/c line, you go some distance towards protecting your range against overbluffs. As for the turn, I think it prefers the check without the diamond to put the IP Add hands in a terrible spot after they bet when checked to, which they will do at a very high frequency: these hands are then forced to call off versus a hand--AA-- against which they have very poor equity. Similarly, AA no diamond can potentially induce a small number of bet-folds against other dd hands, denying them a decent amount of equity immediately on the turn.

17:20: I agree with your assessment that villian will bet too much one pair for value on the river relative to GTO as well as include too many corresponding bluffs, incentivizing you to x/r less frequently on the turn and lead less on the river than GTO would suggest (in addition to the fact that playing a lot of turn x/r and river lead makes your overall strategy more complex and thereby more difficult to play). This overly-thin IP value betting strategy also has implications on your OOP flop strategy. Facing villians who consistently bet too thin over multiple steets on blank runouts incenvtives OOP to slowplay more hands on the flop, I would think. You become less concerned about targeting certain IP hands for indifference on flop and turn with x/r (as well as fighting for equity with some of your draws like 9T) and more preoccupied about constructing an inordinately strong check-call down range against IP who will put too much money into the pot with marginal hands and bluffs.

To qualify: I usually almost always overfold AQo in these spots by default, even when I have a vague feeling that I might be overflolding facing a GTO range. I typically have some implicit understanding that I, personally, don't always play these complex spots competently OOP; and I don't want to put myself in a situation wherein I have to defend a weak and/or capped range on later streets. Even somewhat weaker players can usually, as IP, figure out ways to put a lot of pressure on capped ranges on turn and river. Moreover, it might be argued, that IP overbet flop ranges, on boards such as these, are typically composed in such a way that calling the AQo hands are losing immediate EV. This happens, for instance, when IP fails to find a lot of those marginal QTo, KTo, KQo type overbet bluffs and instead bets a lot for protection with hands like 99 or TT, or as a semi-bluff.

Yeah, I suppose you're right: it does cost a lot to of immediate equity to overfold AQo, KQo, QxTx hands OOP versus overbet. I was considering the implications of OOP having to call some of these hands, and because of a suboptimal x/r strategy, facing extremely negative EV decisions with them on later streets. In other words, I think that villains who don't understand what sorts of overall strategy they should play against overbet are bound to lose with these hands, regardless of whether they overfold flop or later streets.
Against overbet, it appears, according to the solver, OOP wants to be playing a small, almost click-back strategy to battle those sorts of KTo, QTo, even QxTx backdoor hands that gain so much against AQo type flop folds. I think against the vast majority of villains, this is hardly ever the case. If villain is not playing this click back sort of strategy; and, like you said, is playing a more polarized x/r strategy, your KTo and QTo hands do really well betting the large size, both in theory and especially from an exploitative perspective. I was surprised to see that facing 125% on flop, OOP, when limited to the option of raising pot, hardly ever raises 88 or 66. It seems that if he isn't playing a strategy wherein he's trying to make those sorts of low-equity overbet bluffs from IP indifferent on the flop, that he has to keep his range unusually strong so that he can better contend with IP aggression on later streets. Playing a polarized x/r strategy that includes too many of your strongest hands, puts OOP in a position wherein his flop calling range is quite weak and capped: it means that against a strong IP player, he's going to be unable to meet defense thresholds on future streets. So, while it is certainly negative EV to overfold those mixed defends immediately on the flop, it seems unlikely you'll lose much more than you would by calling them at reasonably correct frequencies, but also playing a suboptimal x/r strategy, or not realizing that your weak calls need to be protected by slowplays. Invariably, it'll leave your flop check call range overly weak and capped and expose you to a lot of EV loss against IP turn and river bluffs.

16:54 I agree this makes most sense as a flop Cbet, given turn playability. I'd assume you're potting the turn with this hand most of the time primarily to target folds from IP with some of his bare Kx, and to still get called by pairs and draws your hand dominates? As played, I'd agree that IP has an inordinate number of hands exactly like the one he showed up with --K52--and semibluffs. Still, by the river, IP should have the nuts more frequently, which makes you want to range check; resultantly, you'll end up getting more check backs than you'd like with middle strength hands like these.

43:56: Interesting observation--the difference between OOP C-betting strategy BB vs CO and OOP SB vs CO--and the latter being a range bet. I looked into BB Cbet and CO counter-strategy and remarked that what I see in practice, is in no way similar to what one sees in GTO. BB is expected, in theory, to mix small bets and include a bunch of check-raises against a relatively depolarized and widely mixed CO strategy. I think, in practice, BB checks a decent amount of his moderate strength hands, and doesn't necessarily play much of a x/r strategy. Conversely, CO will often polarize facing check, and BB will play a passive call down or fold strategy (although solver much prefers battling via check-raises). I would guess that SB would misapply this principle to SB vs CO spots as well, which would make me assume that he has either a nothing hand, like the hearts you mentioned, or a moderate strength hand way more often than he would AK or the 99 that actually showed up in his hand.* Therefore, I think assignming him an inordinate amount of HH bluffs in this unforeseen node makes this a good call down.

*As you menionted, 99 is a particularly absurd hand to play this way. Using a more conventional small range C-bet on the flop, bet turn and jam river, he would still, more than 2/3 of the time, get all the money from your hand AJdd by the river.

28:42: Does IP do very much bet-folding with stronger two pairs?

19:55: Gets really interesting to start check-raising this hand, A9, if IP overfolds to large turn x/r size. In situations in which opponent pure folds hands like QJ (as opposed to mix-fold), you can even, it seems, x/r hands beyond A9, like Q3, targeting better Qx to fold on the turn. On the river, you could then pure check assuming IP, in addition to folding too much Qx on the turn, will call a disproportionate number of missed draws: this makes it easy for him to over-bluff the river, especially if he doesn't have a tight grasp on his value thresholds.

15:36: is 1/3 the only size you're giving OOP to continue betting on turn?

Another interesting facet of the hand, as illustrated by your final graph in which BT shoves when checked to, are that certain hands, a bare 7 or 8, for example, fold to an inordinate degree relative to how frequently they shove OOP. I think doing a deeper dive into the nature of what sorts of hands prefer targeting IP folds by betting vs what which are too weak to call vs IP pots might prove enlightening.

9:00: I appreciate, very much, the concept of showing what, by shoving, you're targeting for indifference. I think it'd be improved in this particular graph by forgetting about what calls vs what shoves, which seems of little consequence, relative to the frequencies associated with the various hand classes delineated in the graph. For example, what percent of IP 4-bet air hands, most of which are folding, constitute within the overall IP range? Moreover, how much equity do these hands, which as OOP you're targeting for indifference, have against OOP range?

13:00 table 1: I think you're right about there being some non-intuitive hands OOP won't find to call vs over-bet, e.g. 125% pot. I'm not sure how much over-folding hands like AQo hurts OOP EV, however. Alternatively, do you have any ideas about how OOP might misplay raises on these sorts of marginally connected low boards, either in terms of flop sizing or on subsequent streets?

9:35: I like your observations about leading revolving around position and the suited-ness of the board; I think it does you credit to make these observations, even in the context of a hand replay

21:00: While going half on flop seems a better size to target some of the hands with slightly more equity you mentioned, it does create this awkward stack size on turn. Would you barrel 1/2 again on a small number of turns, 8d for example, or are you pretty much always potting with 1.8x pot left effective?

20:15: Interesting point regarding C-bet sizing in 5-card PLO: it seems logical. What sorts of hands are you targeting for indifference with 1/2 that you wouldn't be with 1/3? Does 1/3 rarely feature on other dry boards?

8:11: Your GTO analysis is pretty rigorous. Presumably, you didn't know, at the time of the hand, how weak a villian you were facing? You make no allusions earlier in the hand that you thought IP might be severely overdefending flop with the sort of hand he ended up bluffing on the river. It changes the nature of your river decision. To begin with, your river block is already close. According to some parameters, your hand nearly almost bets. Adjusting them slightly, however, turns your hand into an almost pure check. For example, in the solution I derived, after betting slightly larger on turn, you almost always checking the two pairs, J5 and J4, on river while retaining the block for your sets. You then use this hand as a frequency bluff catch, typically against the range to which you already alluded, 6x hands and the like. Either way, whether to block on river with J5 is a close decision from a GTO perspective. Therefore, the decision whether or not to bet, should probably be made acccording to exploitative dictates. For example, do you agree that against block IP will be overdefending overpairs facing river block? If so, block will almost certainly be the way to go. Similarly, it might be the case that block over-induces bluff raises from IP relative to the sorts of bluffs he makes facing a check. Such a conclusion seems to be borne out by the results of the hand; although it seems unlikely that IP will find significant missed heart bluff raises on river as he is expected to, for example with AhQh. Overall, what is your exploitative perspective on the hand given the closeness of the river block bet?

9:00: I don't like the bluff; I think the sizing is good, but I disagree with the combo. I think you're right that villian, wether recreational or not, doesn't check back enough Kx on the flop. Most people, myself included, don't usually play the polarized strategy on this board espoused by solver; but even if villian uses a small flop stab--as opposed to a more optimal large C-bet size--he still is expecting to check back a decent amount of Kx on the flop. This means your river overbet is correct. Were IP to have any amount of Kx on the river, a smaller size would be more appropriate. Given that he likely doesn't, your overbet does a good job of targeting his Qx. Still, one has to assume that recreational or not, JJ and TT have to be two of his most common flop check backs into turn calls and river folds facing your line. JT blocks these folds to an inordinate extent. Therefore, I think that even low diamonds, 6d4d, for example, would be better bluffs unblocking JJ,TT.

29:20: I didn't think the hand seemed particularly 'standard' by both. You mentioned OTF that the large check raise size represented mostly two pair plus for value. I think KQo that flats pre seems like the weakest primary flop XR for 'value,' at least according to GTO. Presumably, Linus, has an exploitative reason; and, by check-raising QT, is assuming a sub-optimal IP response. Might he think that IP will be overdefending certain hands, J9o or Qd3d, for instance, against the light check raise? It seems pretty improbable that he expects an overfold by hands with equity. Nevertheless, even were Linus expecting a suboptimal IP response to an overly loose flop X/R, it's hardly easy to play OOP after putting too much money in OTF.
Case in point, I think Linus ends up putting too much money in by the river. IP bets turn and river for amounts that correspond very closely to the exact value of his specific hand, and Linus pays off.
Something else I explored in the Solver for this hand were turn IP sizings. The size IP ended up using was correct, assuming GTO play on both ends. What interested me was the OOP response facing a 33% sizing. Against it, OOP must play an extremely complex strategy with some of his flop X/R draws, such as KTo, T8o, KJo, whereby he calls, X/R, and folds different combos. Similarly, protecting his range requires a complex strategy with his two-pair hands, whereby he checks a decent portion planning to mix raises and calls facing a bet. If anyone is capable of executing such a strategy, it's Linus. However, his light flop X/R hinders him severely. His top pairs constitute, overwhelmingly, the largest portion of hands that demand turn X/C facing any size (he can't x/r or mix folds). Thereby, by having too many flop X/R with hands like QT, Linus puts himself in a bind on later streets, as illustrated in this hand, where he affords his opponent a good opportunity to maximize value with his exact hand.