As mentioned, start with folding to river bets. Start with spots where you were the preflop aggressor. Analyze how it came to you folding the river - and if by chance you maybe had a profitable call, due to equity and pot odds. Then work from there (by changing / expanding filter).
Dec. 9, 2019 | 2:14 p.m.
What stake is it? You're playing overly tight, with very little 3-bet.
Your WTSD% is too low, your W$SD is too high, as well as the River Call Efficiency. That points to folding the best hand too often. WWSF is too low as well.
Overall, you're (way) too tight and - which is surprising your strong open-range - too passive / weak postflop.
Still you seem to maintain solid winrates which means you're playing in a super-weak pool. There you might get away with this style, but once you try to play higher, you will likely get destroyed with that style.
So, work on marking spots in game where you folded (start with river and then work backwards), analyze your opponent's assumed range and calculate if you had had the right equity to call. Calculate how much money your fold has cost you. Make that a regular habit of your sessions post-mortem-analysis.
Dec. 9, 2019 | 7:42 a.m.
Pio IS exploitative. Just to get that out of the way.
If we assume our opponent to play "suboptimal" (which is likely in general), we should have a clear plan on HOW he deviates from the opt. When we know that, deviation ourselves is a) easy and b) mandatory. Otherwise, sticking to Pio is best - because anything else is shooting into fog.
Dec. 5, 2019 | 8:21 a.m.
Just do the old-fashioned way. Take an EQ-calculator, give your opponents assumed ranges and check your EQ. Then calculate how much EQ you need (22%, if I calculated correctly). Then - important - don't compare the two values but take EQR (equity realization) into account. If you need 22% and have 20% for example, you need 110% EQR. Then think about if you can achieve that.
Factors that affect EQR are position, domination, (reverse) implieds, skills, etc.
Obviously EQR is another concept to learn and know, but it's more concrete and it gives you the "framework".
Nov. 29, 2019 | 5:43 a.m.
"We have to call". I like this. :-) The question should not be if there is any range that might bring us close to 41% (in which case we could still fold because it does not matter!), but how likely that is!!
In other words, there are two approaches:
1) You come up with a reasonable range that gives us 45%+ - in that case we "have" to call.
2) You work with a "double-probability-check":
Range A = EQ(A)
Range B = EQ(B)
As we know too little about this game (how can a 38/3 be NOT passive?), give these ranges weights. And then calculate your assumed EQ by:
EQ exp. = P(A) * EQ(A) + P(B) * EQ(B)
When EQ exp. hits 41% (or above) you call.
Otherwise you just fold. Winning hands might feel good - even with 0EV, but feelings are not the point. EV is.
Sorry for sounding wiseass. :D
Nov. 29, 2019 | 5:36 a.m.
Ugh ... such a broad question. :) The answer is the explanation of Game Theory. But I will try in a nutshell:
First, Game Theory aims at maximal EV. ALWAYS. In other words, target of Game Theory is to maximally exploit the other player. No matter what he does. First surprising fact for many, who view "GTO = breakeven".
Second, the term GTO is kind of misleading - or at least ambigious. The full text is "game theory optimal" and that actually means the "best way to play in a single situation". If our opponent plays badly, the best (= optimal) way is to brutally exploit him. And that IS GTO, even though, nobody would name it like that. It would be rather defined as "exploitive", many even strictly separate between "GTO" and "exploitive" play which is nonsense.
That means a "GTO player" (let's name him "Solver") will always exploit his opponent. That happens when you lock a bad strategy for IP and let OOP feel free how to react. He will crush. Obviously - because that's what he lives for. "He's a terminator.". :)
Now, let's assume IP is not locked badly, but tries exactly the same. Now, two players are trying to exploit each other. The "problem" is, any exploit leaves us exploitable ourselves - and the opponent will "immediately" recognize and react accordingly. That means, the exploits get smaller and smaller. Up to the point where both players take their "fair share", no exploitation happens anymore.
That state of the game is called the Nash Equilibrium or "Game Theory Optimum". It's a special situation where two players "exploit each other maximally" which by definition means that they actually don't, because neither IS actually exploitable anymore. Nobody can deviate from his strategy (= exploit) because no exploitation is possible.
Now, let's assume OOP locks his GTO strategy. He's unexploitable, which means IP can do what he wants, IP won't increase his EV. Can he decrease his EV? That would mean, IP gets exploitable again - which would give OOP the chance to take advantage of. But if OOP is locked (to his GTO strat), no exploitation will happen - which means, the EV of OOP will not be affected (neither the EV of IP). To make it happen, we have to allow OOP to make his job again.
Simple example? I know, many will roll the eyes, but for explanation it's a wonderful example: Rock-Paper-Scissors.
Let's assume "OOP" plays "optimally" - i.e. exploits his opponent in realtime, whatever leak IP will show up with. Now, IP has a natural tendency to choose rock more often than the rest. The remaining will be chosen equally, so let's assume, his distribution is 50 - 25 - 25 (R-P-S). What's OOP's best strategy now? => 100% Paper!! He will win 50%, tie 25% and lose 25%. No other strategy will yield a higher EV. So that's his maxexploit strat. Now, IP recognizes that sth. is wrong - and (after hours) he gets, that OOP always chooses Rock, so he now chooses 100% paper. OOP, a little quicker in observation will immediately react and adjust. Now, when both players are equally skilled, they will actually settle at 33-33-33 - both of them!
Now, let's lock OOP with his optimal 33-33-33-strat. IP will be locked at a "bad" strategy again, namely 100% paper. What will happen? The EV of OOP will not change at all!! 33% he loses (rock vs. paper), 33% he ties (paper vs. paper) and 33% he wins (scissors vs. paper). Take any other "bad" strat of IP and nothing will change.
That pretty nicely illustrates that w/o adjustments, no exploitation will happen. And as GTO = max. exploitation (!!!!), it is no GTO anymore.
Nov. 21, 2019 | 1:02 p.m.
It's not possible to use the Range Visualizer for the entire pool (afaik). You had to define an alias of a defined player pool and then you could use the heatmap for this alias.
You could define a heatmap with custom statistics, but that is pretty complicated. Alternatives are commercial 3rd party products.
Easy way to analyze pool behaviour is to define a report:
1) go to "My Reports"
2) create new report "All Players Report"
3) add "Hole Cards" to the column list
4) add whatever action / setup you're interested in as filter (i.e. "3bet steal")
5) exlude Hero by adding a new filter "Player is Hero" and then setting it to "NOT"
But be aware that all these reports fail to paint the entire picture as there are only hands included that went to showdown. You will never get the real stat that way, i.e. if one player once 3-bet 72o against a steal and it went to showdown, you will see 72o as "100%", because PT4 does not know about the other 99.999999% where this hand was simply folded.
Nov. 16, 2019 | 9:42 p.m.
... and he flipped over KTo lol.
Probably you avoided QJ turn and river. ;-D
Nov. 12, 2019 | 1:19 p.m.
Aiming for specific stats is most likely not the right way. It's way too playerstyle- and pool-specific. The "only" real indicator, stat-wise, should be EV.
That said, a comprehensive database analysis, based on EV-analysis for each spot (i.e. cbetting, facing cbet, facing x/r etc. for each street) and comparing it to alternative lines (i.e. cbet vs. x/r, calling riverbarrels vs. folding / bluffraising and such) is the way to go.
I will PM you.
Nov. 11, 2019 | 1:57 p.m.
Balance NEVER is a goal, it's a side effect. Every combo will be played maxEV. When TP hands are bet so much more, it simply means, the EV is higher. Now, the more we bet for value, the more we can bluff now (as EV of more bluffs are higher now as well).
What is the scenario - potsize on flop, betsize(s) of SB?
Nov. 10, 2019 | 6:52 p.m.
First of all, you didn't ask for preflop but make it bigger - you got the 3rd nuts against a zoo of honks, take advantage of this!
Then, MDF is nonsense in this spot - as PCR already explained.
But even if you were to fall back to MDF, your calculation is not 100% correct - for two reasons:
1) You don't want to keep him 0EV, but indifferent (between bluffing and giving up). That means, his "bluffs" still had EQ, which he could've realized by checking. That is EV > 0. Hence, indifference does not mean 0EV, but something positive - which allows you to defend less then "MDF". (Ah ... and MDF is a horrible term anyways, because it's utterly wrong!!! It should be named "ODF" :-D).
2) If you don't shove, you let him realize all his EQ with his bluffs, which again means, that you have to increase your defense frequency again - again, to keep him "indifferent".
1) and 2) do not exactly weigh out each other, it's a bit more complicated.
All that said, I am with Prank, as such a guy can have all (!) Ax in his range, your EV seems pretty equal (close to 0), whatever you do. So just skip it and wait for more information.
Nov. 9, 2019 | 7:14 a.m.
Hero raised UTG and got 3-bet. Villain obviously commits himself - 4-way. What indicators - other than hope - lead us to expect enough bluffs in his range? Who - sane enough - will "ever" bluff in that situation (not to mention "often enough")?
Oct. 31, 2019 | 5:47 a.m.
Overbets don't drop from sky or are subject of taste / fashion. There's a mathematical background. The bigger we (over-)bet, the less Villain got to defend. If we overbet 2x pot, Villain only got to defend 33% of his original range. Pretty quickly, the remainder gets so strong that we shoot ourselves into the foot.
When we overbet slightly, Villain got to defend like 45%, and this is were many players get difficulties to come up with enough range - facing the threat of still coming overbets on turn / river.
That said, before we overbet we should have a clear picture of our and Villain's ranges and decide what part we want to bet for value against what part of Villain's defense range.
And when we think that there's some "exploitive" treshold that makes it maximally uncomfortable for Villain to defend properly, then we should do it - which easily can settle at sth. like 120%.
Oct. 26, 2019 | 9:10 p.m.
Your line is perfectly fine and tells a coherent story. Valuebetting worse is highly unlikely, so it all comes down to the question if this guy (ever) bluffs often enough. And you already answered the question. Hence, this should be a fold (with a note that this guy likes to play tricky himself). Overall you have a bunch of better hands in your range yourself (AK, JJ, AJ, Axs), so it's unlikely you get heavily exploited.
Oct. 22, 2019 | 2:53 p.m.
I'd put him on JTss, fold and wait for more information on him before I start playing games with him.
A "young male, 24", who apparently changes the table after witnessing what's going on is more likely knowing what he does than not. And he knows that he has a pretty good chance to face two-pair+.
You mention your range - honestly, I'm a big GTO fan (as most probably know :D), but in this special case, I'd give a shit. This special situation (huge iso-raise pre, special board structure) happens like once in a gazillion times, if you open-folded that hand any single time in your poker career, you wouldn't even recognize it in your winrate. So, shrug, fold and go on. :-)
Oct. 11, 2019 | 6:46 a.m.
If you talk about Snowie and then write "2. What's wrong with calling and keep villans range wide letting him bet his bluffs. " it shows that you are not really aware of what Snowie actually does or how it works - or more general with GTO overall.
This is no criticism (very few actually do), but it shows that what you are currently doing (?) might not be the best way for you to learn.
Might sound unfriendly or offensive, but is not meant that way at all. It's really meant as a friendly advice. :-)
Sept. 28, 2019 | 7:50 a.m.
Are you asking from a GTO-point-of-view - or from a practical, stake-related?
Given the latter one, I'd expect players with ANY Ax to call the river - simply because they can't fold. And they give a shit on your range. They might not feel happy (if they think about it at all - and not just clicking the call-button), but they call nevertheless.
As a rule of thumb, trying to kick someone off TP is a very hazardous idea on low stakes. Just stay away from it. :-)
Sept. 25, 2019 | 11:45 a.m.
From a theoretical point of view, shortstack play increases advantage of OOP and decreases advantage of IP. As IP play is a major source of EV, it should be a matter-of-fact that overall EV decreases short stacked.
To compensate the decrease of EV, we need a bigger skill advantage.
Sept. 25, 2019 | 11:42 a.m.
Probably not. On the low stakes rake is gonna be too high. On the mid and higher stakes, rake won't be enough, because the room owners need "splashy" games to generate rake. But splashy games again will be dried out by a) a generally growing basic sense for the game and b) good players taking advantage quicker than ever from bad players.
And drunken guys with too much money are juicy but don't feed the game alone (ignoring the mental aspect).